ABSTRACT. This article explicitly constructs and classifies all arrovian voting systems on three or more alternatives. If we demand orderings to be complete, we have, of course, Arrow's classical dictator theorem, and a closer look reveals the classification of all such voting systems as dictatorial hierarchies. If we leave the traditional realm of complete orderings, the picture changes. Here we consider the more general setting where alternatives may be incomparable, that is, we allow orderings that are reflexive and transitive but not necessarily complete. Instead of a dictator we exhibit a junta whose internal hierarchy or coalition structure can be surprisingly rich. We give an explicit description of all such voting systems, generalizing and unifying various previous results. 
INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF RESULTS
1.1. Motivation and background. Classifying the objects of an axiomatic theory is a natural endeavour whenever it promises to be feasible and meaningful. In the case of arrovian voting systems, it seems that this approach has remained implicit and has not been systematically investigated in the published literature. This absence is all the more surprising as the arrovian axioms were the first to be considered, and characterizations have long been accomplished for several other classes of voting rules, such as simple majority rule [9] or scoring rules [11, 13] .
Ideally, a classification comprises two goals: firstly, establish a precise description and compile an exhaustive list of all solutions satisfying the requirements, and secondly, eliminate possible redundancy by identifying duplicate descriptions of the same solution.
For complete orderings of at least three alternatives, the theorem of K.J. Arrow [3] says that every voting system satisfying the axioms of unrestricted domain, unanimity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives is dictatorial. As stated, this result does not yet determine the voting system: if the dictator is indifferent, then all outcomes are still possible. Nonetheless, the dictator theorem can be used to classify arrovian voting systems: by a careful induction argument one can exhibit a dictatorial hierarchy, as stated in Theorem 7.
From linear to partial orderings.
Arrow's classical result makes essential use of the hypothesis that orderings be complete (also called linear or total). While reflexivity and transitivity seem indispensable for social orderings, the requirement of completeness is certainly less fundamental. Driven by Arrow's negative result, it seems worthwhile to drop completeness and to consider the more general setting of partial orderings (also called quasi-orderings). As we will see, this framework allows for much more flexibility, and in particular Arrow's dictator theorem is no longer valid. It is thus natural to explore the limits and to boldly ask: what exactly are the possibilities?
As J.A. Weymark [12] pointed out, "there has been surprisingly little work done explicitly on social quasi-orderings". He went on to establish an arrovian result by proving the existence of an oligarchy, i.e. a unique minimal decisive set of voters. He did not discuss explicit examples, nor did he strive for a classification of possible voting systems.
In this article we consider the general setting of partial orderings and analyze it as thoroughly as possible. We explicitly construct and classify all arrovian voting systems on three or more alternatives: we exhibit a junta 1 and precisely describe its internal hierarchy or coalition structure. To this end we reconsider the notion of (strongly) decisive sets, which allows us to classify the simple case (Theorem 1). We then introduce the refined notion of relatively decisive sets, which allows us to analyze and reconstruct the inner workings of every arrovian voting system (Theorem 2).
1.3. Relatively decisive sets. We will use fairly standard notation, as recalled in §2 below. Throughout this article, I is the set of individuals (voters), and 2 I denotes the collection of its subsets. Up to §4 we will tacitly assume I to be finite of size n, say I = {1, 2, . . ., n}, but almost all arguments are valid for infinite sets as well. We will make this explicit in §5.
We denote by A the set of alternatives, and we will always assume that A contains at least three elements. The set of all partial preorders on A is denoted by P A . A voting system is a map C : P I A → P A . We will exclusively be interested in the arrovian case, where C satisfies the axioms of unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
In order to adapt the arrovian approach to partial orderings, we first revisit the notion of (strongly) decisive subsets of I and establish the following result: X ⊔Y the union of two disjoint sets, that is, X ⊔Y = X ∪Y with X ∩Y = / 0.) By definition, δ and ∆ encode what could be called the coalition structure underlying the voting system C. This data is then shown to characterize every arrovian voting system, and we construct several examples in order to illustrate the possibilities.
Theorem 2. Given an arrovian voting system C : P I
A → P A on three or more alternatives, there exists a map δ : 2 I → 2 I such that δ N is the minimal decisive set relative to N. Moreover, ∆ : 2 I → 2 I , ∆N = δ N ⊔ N is the unique map enjoying the following properties: (3) . The resulting voting system C ∆ satisfies the arrovian axioms of unanimity, neutrality, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Condition (2) ensures that δ N is the minimal decisive set relative to N.
An analogous version holds for infinite societies but its statement is necessarily more involved, see Remark 56 or more generally Theorem 67 at the end of this article.
The previous theorem establishes a bijective correspondence: every arrovian voting system C : P I A → P A is characterized by the associated coalition structure ∆ : 2 I → 2 I . Even though conditions (1) and (2) may look technical at first sight, they are easy enough to verify for any given map ∆, and lend themselves well to the construction of examples: Example 3. We consider a set I = {1, 2, 3} of three voters and choose ∆ / 0 = {1, 2} as the smallest decisive subset. Then we necessarily have ∆{3} = {1, 2, 3}, and we also know that ∆{1} and ∆{2} must each contain {1, 2}. We choose ∆{1} = {1, 2, 3} and ∆{2} = {1, 2}.
This fixes all remaining choices to ∆N = {1, 2, 3}. The resulting coalition structure is graphically represented in Figure 1 . In words, the associated voting system C ∆ works as follows. Given alternatives a, b ∈ A, voters 1 and 2 together can decide either a ≻ b or a ≺ b if both agree. If 2 is indifferent, then 1 alone can decide either a ≻ b or a ≺ b. If 1 is indifferent, however, then the decision is not left to 2 alone, but to 2 and 3: they can decide a b or a b if both agree. In all other cases the conclusion is a ⊥ b, that is, a and b are considered incomparable.
Notice that in this example each voter can influence the outcome: we have a ≈ b if and only if all three voters are indifferent (axiom of strong unanimity).
Remark 4.
The apparent complexity is not an artefact of our proof but faithfully reflects the large variety of arrovian voting systems. A certain complexity is thus unavoidable: the map ∆ encodes the coalition structure, and, as in game theory or political practice, coalitions are in general a complicated matter. Even in small examples such as the previous one, the verbal description can become quite cumbersome, and the formal description using the characteristic map ∆ is usually preferable.
1.5. Back to linear orderings. One can weaken the hypotheses by requiring the voting system C to be defined only on the set of linear orderings. All of our arguments apply with only minor changes, and we obtain the following result: We obtain this result here as a corollary of the general classification, but it can also be derived by iterated application of Arrow's classical dictator theorem. Its generalization to infinite societies is stated in Theorem 59, towards the end of this article.
1.6. How this article is organized. Section 2 recalls the relevant definitions and notation, in particular concerning orderings ( §2.1) and arrovian voting systems ( §2.2). Section 3 reconsiders the notions of decisive and strongly decisive sets ( §3.1) and establishes their fundamental properties ( §3.2). This leads to the characterization of juntas without internal structure ( §3.3). In order to treat the general case, Section 4 develops the refined notion of relatively decisive sets ( §4.1) and discusses lexicographic voting rules as a principal example ( §4.2). These tools allow us to formulate and prove the general classification of arrovian juntas ( §4.3) and its application to the case of linear orderings ( §4.4). Section 5, finally, generalizes these results to infinite societies.
DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
Our first task is to set the stage so that the classification can unfold as smoothly as possible. While the general axiomatic approach is standard, considerable care must be taken to adjust (and motivate) certain details of our definitions. For this reason, and to make this article self-contained, we will develop our arguments from scratch.
2.1. Orderings. In the sequel, A will denote the set of alternatives (decisions, proposals, candidates, policies, allocations, issues, etc.) and preferences will be modelled by orderings on A. More precisely, a partial preorder on A is a binary relation P ⊆ A × A that is reflexive and transitive, i.e. it enjoys the following two properties:
Reflexivity: We have (a, a) ∈ P for all a ∈ A. Transitivity: Whenever (a, b) ∈ P and (b, c) ∈ P then (a, c) ∈ P. Throughout this article we will use the term ordering as synonymous with partial preorder. We will interpret (a, b) ∈ P as expressing that alternative a is at least as preferable as alternative b. Notice that indifference is allowed, that is, (a, b) ∈ P and (b, a) ∈ P can hold simultaneously for two distinct alternatives a, b ∈ A. Moreover, a and b can be incomparable, that is, neither (a, b) ∈ P nor (b, a) ∈ P holds.
Notation. The set of all orderings P ⊆ A × A, i.e. partial preorders on A, will be denoted by P A . We usually write a b to denote (a, b) ∈ P. Indifference Remark 8. Indifference and incomparability are very different concepts. Notice in particular that indifference is an equivalence relation (i.e. reflexive, symmetric, and transitive), whereas incomparability is never reflexive and in general not transitive.
Incomparability (a ⊥ b) is to be interpreted as saying that the comparison between a and b remains undecided on the grounds of the available information. Indifference (a ≈ b), however, expresses the conviction that a and b are equally preferable. Thus, whenever a voting system cannot reach a conclusion between alternatives a and b, it seems reasonable to declare them incomparable, rather than equivalent.
Mathematically speaking, partial preorders are a convenient setting because they allow for sufficient flexibility. Admittedly, it is a very general concept and may seem remote from realistic applications. But then again it nicely models human judgements, where indifference and undecidedness seem to enter quite naturally. A complete preorder (as opposed to partial) is also called linear or total: all alternatives are ranked in a linear fashion, possibly with ties. We denote by L A ⊂ P A the set of linear orderings. An order or strict ordering is required to be antisymmetric, and a linear order is required to be complete and antisymmetric. This last notion is the most restrictive one: it amounts to a strict ranking of all alternatives, without ties, i.e. a 1 ≻ a 2 ≻ . . . ≻ a m in the case of a finite set A of m alternatives.
Remark 10. Some authors, partly on the basis of empirical psychological evidence, are even willing to sacrifice transitivity, but we will not do so here. Transitivity is the fundamental constraint in this whole business and should not be given up. All of our arguments will entirely rely on transitivity, and all constructions will carefully preserve this property.
2.2.
Arrovian voting systems. Let P A be the set of all partial preorders on A, and let I be the set of individuals (voters, agents, committee members). We will usually assume that I is finite of size n. The cases n = 0 and n = 1 are trivial but shall not be excluded. The subtleties of infinite societies will be discussed in §5.
An n-tuple (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P I A is called a preference profile. The rank aggregation problem is to single out suitable functions C : P I A ⊇ D → P A , where the domain D is some subset of preference profiles, usually D = P I A or D = L I A . In voting theory, C is called a voting system or voting rule or social welfare function: it associates to every profile (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ D of individual preferences P 1 , . . . , P n an aggregate preference P = C(P 1 , . . . , P n ). We refer to A. Sen [10] as a general reference.
Notation. It will be convenient to write a b instead of (a, b) ∈ P, and analogously a i b as shorthand for (a, b) ∈ P i . The analogous notation a ≻ b, a ≈ b, a ⊥ b, and a ≻ i b, a ≈ i b, a ⊥ i b with i ∈ I will also be used. Given a subset J ⊆ I, we define a J b to signify a j b for all j ∈ J, and analogously a ≻ J b to mean a ≻ j b for all j ∈ J, etc.
In the sequel we will consider voting systems C : changes in favour of a or remains unchanged, then the same holds true for the aggregate preference. Formally, consider P = C(P 1 , . . . , P n ) and
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA):
The aggregate ranking between a and b depends only on their individual pairwise rankings. Formally, consider
(This is a consequence of monotonicity.) Neutrality: All alternatives are treated symmetrically, i.e. we have C(ρ * P 1 , . . . , ρ * P n ) = ρ * C(P 1 , . . . , P n ) for all P 1 , . . . , P n ∈ P A and every permutation ρ : A → A.
Anonymity: All individuals are treated symmetrically, i.e. we have C(P σ 1 , . . . , P σ n ) = C(P 1 , . . . , P n ) for all P 1 , . . . , P n ∈ P A and every permutation σ : I → I.
Definition 11. Throughout this article we will suppose that A contains three or more alternatives. A voting system C : P I A → P A will be called arrovian if it satisfies the axioms of unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Remark 12.
As a word of caution, we should point out that we allow the trivial voting system C / 0 : P I A → P A , C / 0 (P 1 , . . . , P n ) = A × A, declaring all alternatives equivalent, independently of the preference profile (P 1 , . . . , P n ). It satisfies all arrovian axioms except strict unanimity and strong unanimity, but apart from serving as a counter-example it is completely uninteresting. Most authors exclude trivial voting systems by demanding strict unanimity, and we will recover this condition as a special case of our classification, see Corollary 24. The weaker axiom of unanimity is preferable because it behaves well under restriction of the electorate, see Remark 35.
Immediate consequences.
We have already noticed that monotonicity implies IIA. In the presence of three alternatives, these two axioms become equivalent:
Lemma 13. If there are at least three alternatives, then unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives imply neutrality and monotonicity.
Proof. Consider a voting system C : P I A → P A satisfying unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We will first show neutrality, in a stronger form combining both neutrality and independence of irrelevant alternatives:
Strong neutrality: Consider P = C(P 1 , . . . , P n ) and
Given two alternatives a, b ∈ A, let X (a, b) be the set of all pairs (X,Y ) such that a b with X = {i | a i b} and Y = {i | a i b}. We claim that X (a, b) does not depend on the specific alternatives a and b, that is, X (a, b) is the same for all pairs (a, b).
We will first show that we can replace b by any other alternative b ′ ∈ A {a, b}, according to the following duplicated profile:
Analogously we can replace a by any other alternative a ′ ∈ A {a, b}. This ultimately leads to
In order to prove monotonicity, we want to compare two profiles P = C(P 1 , . . . , P n ) and
Assuming a b we want to show that a ′ b. We choose b ′ ∈ A {a, b} and construct a third profile P ′′ = C(P ′′ 1 , . . . , P ′′ n ) that duplicates P on the pair (a, b) and P ′ on the pair Notice that for J to be decisive we only demand that a ≻ J b imply a b. The expected stronger conclusion a ≻ b will be a consequence, shown in Proposition 19, provided that the voting system is non-trivial.
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Remark 15. The axiom of unanimity states that I is strongly decisive for every pair (a, b). Obviously strongly decisive implies decisive. Given neutrality, if a subset is (strongly) decisive for one pair (a, b), then it is (strongly) decisive for all pairs. Given monotonicity, it suffices to consider the worst case:
( Proof. Given two alternatives a, b ∈ A, we will show that the outcome for a and b depends only on the sets X = { j ∈ J | a j b} and Y = { j ∈ J | a j b}. Consider a third alternative a ′ ∈ A {a, b} and assume a ′ X b and a ′ Y b, as well as a ≈ J a ′ . Then a ≈ a ′ because J is strongly decisive. The preferences on {a ′ , b} determine the outcome on {a ′ , b}, and thus the outcome on {a, b} because a ≈ a ′ . We can thus arbitrarily modify the preferences of I J on {a, b} without changing the outcome. Proof. Assume that J 1 and J 2 are decisive. Given a ≻ J b we want to show that a b. We can choose a third alternative x ∈ A {a, b} and arrange a ≻ J 1 x and x ≻ J 2 b as follows:
Proposition 17 (Intersection property
We obtain a x because J 1 is decisive, and x b because J 2 is decisive, hence a b by transitivity. This proves that J = J 1 ∩ J 2 is decisive for (a, b), hence decisive by neutrality. The argument for strongly decisive sets is analogous, by replacing "≻" with " ". 
By neutrality and monotonicity, a b implies b c, hence a c by transitivity. Now Remark 15 (1) applies and we conclude that K is decisive for (a, c), hence decisive.
Proposition 19. For a decisive set K ⊆ I the following conditions are equivalent:
( Proof. The implication (1) ⇒ (2) follows from Proposition 17: if K ′ is decisive, then
The implication (2) ⇒ (3) follows from Lemma 18: if a b then {i ∈ I | a i b} is decisive. It necessarily contains the smallest decisive subset K, thus a K b. By contraposition, if a k b for some k ∈ K then a b.
The implication (3) ⇒ (1) is clear: if K ′ ⊆ K is decisive, then k ∈ K K ′ has no veto power. This being excluded, we necessarily have
Remark 20 (Oligarchies). In the terminology of Weymark [12] , following Gibbard [6] , the minimal decisive set K ⊆ I is an oligarchy, in the sense that its members can impose a ≻ b in the case of unanimity a ≻ K b, while each individual member k ∈ K has veto power, i.e. a ≺ k b implies a b. Weymark studied only voting systems C : L I A → P A and thus excluded incomparabilities in the individual preferences. The preceding proposition proves the stronger version that a k b implies a b, which covers both a ≺ k b and a ⊥ k b.
Remark 21 (Arrow's theorem). Our arguments also hold for voting systems C : L I A → P A defined on the subset L A ⊂ P A of linear orderings. Restricting to this domain simplifies the proofs, but does not change the results in an essential way.
Restricting the range, however, is more severe. If we consider C : L I A → L A , then the minimal decisive subset K cannot contain more than one individual: if two individuals i, j ∈ K have veto power, then a ≻ i b and a ≺ j b would imply a ⊥ b. We thus obtain, as a by-product, Arrow's classical dictator theorem. (We will come back to this in §4.4.)
Analogously, we have a sufficient criterion for strong decisiveness:
We choose a third alternative a ′ ∈ A {a, b} and consider the following profile:
By neutrality, a ≈ b implies a ′ ≈ b, whence a ≈ a ′ . Now Remark 15 (2) applies and we conclude that N is strongly decisive for (a, a ′ ), hence strongly decisive.
Proposition 23. For a strongly decisive set J ⊆ I the following conditions are equivalent: Remark 25 (Revelation principle). From the very beginning of our discussion we have supposed that the individual preferences P 1 , . . . , P n ∈ P A are known, tacitly assuming that all individuals truthfully reveal their preferences. From a game-theoretic point of view, this assumption is consistent if revealing the true preferences is a Nash equilibrium: no individual is better off by declaring another preference, or in other words, no individual has an incentive to lie. Moreover, individuals have an incentive to truthfully reveal their preferences if each individual preference can potentially decide the outcome. For this strong form of Nash equilibrium it is necessary that C be strongly unanimous: if J I is strongly decisive, then some individuals are systematically excluded from the decision process and have no incentive whatsoever to reveal their preferences.
3.3. Juntas without internal structure. The preceding notions being in place, we can now begin to classify the precise structure of arrovian voting systems. We will first treat the simple case where decisive and strongly decisive subsets coïncide. The general case is more complex and will be treated in the next section.
Example 26. Choose a subset J ⊆ I and define the voting system C J : P I A → P A by C J (P 1 , . . . , P n ) := j∈J P j . This implements the Pareto rule based on J, which means that a b if and only if a j b for all j ∈ J. This can be seen as the "greatest common ordering" unanimously agreed upon by all members of J. In the trivial case J = / 0 we recover the trivial voting system C / 0 (P 1 , . . . , P n ) = A × A. It is easily verified that C J satisfies the axioms of unanimity, neutrality, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Notice also that J is the smallest decisive subset, and at the same time the smallest strongly decisive subset. This property is characteristic in the following sense:
Proposition 27 (Classification of juntas without internal structure). Suppose that the set A contains at least three alternatives and consider a voting system C : P I A → P A that satisfies the axioms of unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let K ⊆ I be the smallest decisive subset, and let J ⊆ I be the smallest strongly decisive subset. Then we have the double inclusion C J ⊆ C ⊆ C K , that is, j∈J P j ⊆ C(P 1 , . . . , P n ) ⊆ k∈K P k for all preference profiles (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P I A . Equality C = C J or C = C K holds if and only if K = J, that is, decisive and strongly decisive subsets coïncide.
Proof. On the one hand, the fact that J is strongly decisive is equivalent to the inclusion j∈J P j ⊆ C(P 1 , . . . , P n ) for all profiles (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ P I A . On the other hand, according to Proposition 19, each member k ∈ K has veto power in the sense that a k b implies a b. This is equivalent to Proof. We claim that the arguments developed for partial orderings still apply to linear orderings, i.e. all the necessary constructions can be carried out within L I A ⊂ P I A . First of all, the definition of (strongly) decisive sets applies to linear orderings (Definition 14). The intersection property remains valid and ensures the existence of a unique minimal decisive set (Proposition 17). We still have the characterization of the minimal decisive set in terms of veto power (Proposition 19); the proof is somewhat simplified by the stronger hypothesis that individual preferences no longer present incomparabilities. Proof. Let C : P I A → P A or C : L I A → P A be an arrovian voting system and let K be its minimal decisive set. Anonymity implies K = / 0 or K = I, thus C = C / 0 or C = C I . Remark 30. Although C J fulfils the arrovian requirements, it is not at all satisfactory:
• In the extreme case J = { j} the voting system C J is dictatorial, with the individual j as dictator. In order to integrate more individuals in the decision process, we have to enlarge the set J, but there is a price to pay: we can no longer ensure a complete ordering of alternatives. Even if we start out with complete orderings P j , their intersection P = j∈J P j may not be complete. In the worst case, we obtain the trivial ordering P = A × A. Given neutrality, if a subset J is (strongly) decisive relative to N for one pair (a, b), then it is (strongly) decisive relative to N for all pairs. In the latter case J is simply called (strongly) decisive relative to N, without reference to any pair (a, b). Notice that in the case N = / 0 we recover the absolute version of (strong) decisiveness as in Definition 14. The interpretation of relative decisiveness is as follows: if the members of N declare themselves neutral in the sense that they regard a and b as being equivalent, then the decision is left to the members of the complement I N. This can be formalized as follows: the inclusion I N ֒→ I induces an inclusion φ N : P
I N A
֒→ P I A , (P i ) i∈I N → (P i ) i∈I by extending with P i = A × A for all i ∈ N. We can thus define the restricted voting system
Proposition 33 (Restriction of the electorate). All arrovian axioms (except strict unanimity) are hereditary in the sense that they remain valid when passing from C to the restriction C N . A subset J ⊆ I N is (strongly) decisive relative to N if and only if J is (strongly) decisive for the voting system C N . All properties established for (strongly) decisive sets thus carry over to (strongly) decisive sets relative to N. In particular, if I is finite, then for each N ⊆ I there exists a unique minimal decisive subset relative to N, denoted δ N ⊆ I N.
For ease of notation it is sometimes more convenient to work with ∆N = δ N ⊔ N. Since N ∩ δ N = / 0, we can recover the initial data via δ N = ∆N N.
Example 34 (Pareto rule). Consider C J : P I A → P A , C J (P 1 , . . . , P n ) := j∈J P j for some fixed subset J ⊆ I. Here we find δ N = J N and ∆N = J ∪ N for all N ⊆ I.
Remark 35. In order to restrict the electorate as explained in Proposition 33, we have to allow trivial voting systems: even if C is non-trivial, it may well be that C N is trivial. This is the case if and only if N is strongly decisive for C, see Proposition 16. In particular, the axiom of strict unanimity is not hereditary and thus technically quite cumbersome.
Trivial voting systems could be avoided by demanding strong unanimity. This axiom is hereditary and our approach could thus be based on this stronger condition. For a finite society I both choices are essentially equivalent: each voting system P I A → P A satisfying unanimity can be restricted to P J A → P A satisfying strong unanimity, where J ⊆ I is the minimal strongly decisive subset. (See Propositions 16 and 23.)
Lexicographic voting rules.
The voting rule C J can be refined by introducing extra structure. The idea is, as could be suspected, that all junta members are equal, but some are more equal than others:
Example 36 (Lexicographic voting rule). Let Ω = {J 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ J ℓ } be an ascending chain of non-empty subsets J λ ⊆ I. We can then define Lex Ω : P I A → P A as follows: Given two alternatives a, b ∈ A, we set a ≈ b if and only if a ≈ J b for all J ∈ Ω. Otherwise, let J ∈ Ω be the smallest set for which we do not have a ≈ J b; we then set a b if and only if a J b, and symmetrically a b if and only if a J b. This is the lexicographic voting rule associated to the chain Ω: one can interpret Ω as a hierarchically ordered junta, with J 1 being the inner circle, J 2 being the enlarged inner circle, etc. Only in the case of indifference is the decision passed down in the hierarchy. Proof. We will first establish the existence of a suitable chain Ω. Given C : P I A → P A , we set J 0 := / 0 and inductively define J λ +1 := ∆J λ . Since I is finite, this sequence will stabilize with some J ℓ = ∆J ℓ . We thus obtain an ascending chain Ω = {J 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ J ℓ }.
• In order to show Lex 
Proof. Obviously (2) implies (2').
. This proves that (1) and (2') imply (2). Proof. This is a consequence of Lemma 18: restricting to the electorate I N we have
Lemma 42. If (1) holds, then (3) becomes equivalent to the following condition:
Proof of Theorem 40. We already know from Lemma 13 that every arrovian voting system C : P I A → P A satisfies neutrality and monotonicity. If I is finite then we can construct the map δ : 2 I → 2 I , N → δ N, by applying Proposition 33. Condition (2) implies that δ N = δ N ′ . We conclude that δ N ⊆ K, which means that δ K is indeed the smallest decisive set relative to N.
Conversely, given ∆ : 2 I → 2 I satisfying (1), we have to verify that the associated voting system C ∆ : P I A → P A is well-defined: the outcome is obviously a reflexive relation, and the only delicate point is transitivity. Having proved that the map C ∆ : P I A → P A is well-defined, we conclude that it satisfies the arrovian axioms: unanimity, neutrality, and independence of irrelevant alternatives are clear by (3), while monotonicity follows from (1). Finally, it remains to show for C ∆ that δ N = ∆N N is indeed the smallest decisive set relative to N: given conditions (1), (2), and (3), this follows from the uniqueness proved above.
Remark 45. The theorem asserts that every arrovian voting system C : P I A → P A on three or more alternatives is characterized by the associated map ∆ : 2 I → 2 I . In particular we can extract the usual global information: K = ∆ / 0 is the smallest decisive subset, whereas the union J = λ ∆ λ K is the smallest strongly decisive subset. More precisely, we can recover the chain Ω = {J 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ J ℓ } defined by J 1 = K and J λ +1 := ∆J λ . According to Proposition 39 we have Lex ′ Ω ⊆ C ⊆ Lex Ω but in general the inclusion can be strict. Example 46. The smallest voting systems that are not of lexicographic type occur for three voters. Example 3 illustrates that the classification is not exhausted by lexicographic voting systems alone. Here we find the chain Ω = {{1, 2} ⊂ {1, 2, 3}}. We have
Corollary 47. We have C ⊆ C ′ if and only if
(⇒) Given C ⊆ C ′ we want to show that every subset K ⊆ I that is decisive for C relative to N is also decisive for
Since K is decisive relative to N we know that a b, and from C ⊆ C ′ we deduce a ′ b. We conclude that K is decisive for C ′ relative to N. (⇐) We suppose that every subset K ⊆ I that is decisive for C relative to N is also decisive for C ′ relative to N. If a b then K = {i | a ≻ i b} is decisive for C relative to N = {i | a ≈ i b}. By hypothesis, K is also decisive for C ′ relative to N. We conclude that a ′ b, as claimed.
Back to linear orderings.
The preceding proofs show a little more than stated in the Classification Theorem 40: one can weaken the requirements by demanding that the voting system C be only defined on the subset L A ⊂ P A of linear orderings (i.e. complete preorders as opposed to partial preorders). We thus obtain the following result: 
This is the lexicographic voting rule associated to the family π = (k 1 , . . . , k ℓ ). As indicated, k λ has priority over k λ +1 , and only in the case of indifference is the decision passed down in the hierarchy. Notice that K = {k 1 } is the minimal decisive set, whereas J = {k 1 , . . . , k ℓ } is the minimal strongly decisive set, and π is a permutation of the set J.
Although the change of domain from P I
A to L I A has turned out to be insignificant, changing the range from P A to L A alters the classification result dramatically. We are led to the following refinement of Arrow's dictator theorem, as stated in Theorem 7:
Corollary 50 (Refined version of Arrow's dictator theorem). Suppose that the set A contains at least three alternatives. Then every map C : L I
A → L A that satisfies unanimity and IIA is a lexicographic voting rule of the form C = Lex π for a unique family π = (k 1 , . . . , k ℓ ) . Let K = δ / 0 be the minimal decisive subset. If K = / 0 then C is the trivial voting system and we conclude that ℓ = 0. Otherwise K contains exactly one element, K = {k 1 }, with k 1 being the dictator. In this case, δ {k 1 } is either empty or contains exactly one element, δ {k 1 } = {k 2 }. In the latter case we find δ {k 1 , k 2 } = / 0 or δ {k 1 , k 2 } = {k 3 }. Iterating this argument, we obtain a family π = (k 1 , . . . , k ℓ ) of distinct elements of I. We conclude that C = Lex π according to Proposition 39.
Proof. Via the inclusion L
Remark 51. If we insist that the voting system be strongly unanimous, then the only solutions are of the form Lex π where π = (k 1 , . . . , k n ) is a permutation of the entire set I. There are thus precisely n! voting systems C : L I A → L A that are strongly unanimous and independent of irrelevant alternatives. Even though dictatorial, they have the advantage to extract a maximum of information within the arrovian setting. The only point of unfairness, of course, is the arbitrary choice of the permutation π, that is, the order of individuals in the hierarchy.
INFINITE SOCIETIES
We conclude this article by adapting our arguments to the case where the set I of voters is infinite. The results are more involved but nevertheless illuminating by placing the finite case in a wider perspective. As before, P I A denotes the set of all preference profiles (P i ) i∈I , or equivalently, of all maps I → P A , i → P i .
Lexicographic voting rules.
For infinite societies, lexicographic voting rules can be defined as in Examples 36 and 37. Here we consider a chain Ω ⊆ 2 I , i.e. a collection of subsets of I that is linearly ordered by inclusion. The only subtlety is that Ω must be wellordered, that is, every non-empty subset Ω ′ ⊆ Ω has a minimal element, i.e. the intersection 
Principal voting systems.
The uniqueness of a minimal decisive subset K ⊆ I remains valid even if the set I of voters is infinite: if two subsets K 1 , K 2 ⊆ I are decisive and minimal, then their intersection is decisive, hence
Our hypothesis that the set I be finite is crucial, however, for establishing the existence of a minimal decisive set:
Example 54. Consider an infinite set I and define C : P I A → P A by the rule a b if and only if a i b for all but finitely many voters i ∈ I. Here every finite set J ⊆ I is negligible since it has no influence on the outcome. Conversely, a subset J ⊆ I is decisive if and only if it has finite complement I J. There is, however, no minimal such set.
Definition 55. An arrovian voting system C : P I A → P A is called principal if for each N ⊆ I there exists a minimal subset M ⊆ I N that is decisive relative to N. In this case M is uniquely determined by N and will be denoted by δ N as before.
Remark 56. Every arrovian voting system on a finite set of voters I is principal. For an infinite society, C : P I A → P A can be principal, for example Lex (J,≤) , or non-principal, as in the preceding Example 54. For principal voting systems the Classification Theorem 40 holds verbatim: given the existence of δ N, the finiteness of I is not used in the proof. Likewise we have the variant for linear orderings formulated in Corollary 48.
Definition 57. Every well-ordered chain Ω of subsets of I can be uniquely indexed by ordinal numbers λ such that Ω = {J λ | λ ≤ ℓ} and J κ ⊂ J λ for κ < λ . We say that Ω is continuously well-ordered if J λ = κ<λ J κ for every limit ordinal λ . Proof. By hypothesis, C is principal, so for each N ⊆ I we can consider the minimal relatively decisive set δ N. We set ∆N = δ N ⊔ N and define J 0 := / 0, and inductively J λ +1 := ∆J λ . In the case of an infinite set I, we proceed by transfinite induction, setting J λ := κ<λ J κ for every limit ordinal λ . Since I is a set, this process must stop with ∆J ℓ = J ℓ for some ordinal ℓ, and we obtain a continuously well-ordered chain Ω = {J λ | λ ≤ ℓ}.
The double inclusion Lex
′ Ω ⊆ C ⊆ Lex Ω follows as in the proof of Proposition 39, and the uniqueness argument generalizes verbatim to continuously well-ordered chains.
We are now in position to prove the converse of Proposition 53 and thus characterize strict lexicographic voting rules. We obtain the following refined version of Arrow's dictator theorem, which comprises the finite and the infinite case: 
Proof. By Proposition 58, we have Lex
′ Ω ⊆ C ⊆ Lex Ω for a unique continuously wellordered chain Ω, but in general this inclusion may be strict. We will now exploit the hypothesis that C(L I A ) ⊆ L A . As shown in the proof of Corollary 50, each δ N is either empty or consists of a single individual. The set J = J ℓ becomes well-ordered via the bijection λ → j λ defined by the condition J λ +1 J λ = { j λ +1 }. According to Proposition 58, we conclude that C = Lex (J,≤) and the pair (J, ≤) is uniquely determined by C.
5.3.
The filter of decisive subsets. For non-principal voting systems we will now explain how to generalize the Classification Theorem 40. As P.C. Fishburn [5] pointed out, the family F of decisive sets forms a filter in the following sense:
Definition 60. A filter on a set I is a collection of subsets F ⊆ 2 I such that , most authors demand / 0 / ∈ F as a fourth filter axiom. We will not do so here because trivial filters naturally occur in the sequel, as the decisive sets of trivial voting systems. Moreover, a filter on a set I is analogous to an ideal in a ring R, and this definition usually includes the ring itself as the trivial ideal. 4 If this is to be excluded, one should speak of proper ideals. We will conform our notation to this algebraic analogy, and thus speak of proper filters if we wish to exclude the trivial case. Remark 63. Given an element i ∈ I, the principal filter ({i}) is an ultrafilter. If I is finite, then every ultrafilter F is of the form F = ({i}). In general, the axiom of choice guarantees that every proper filter is contained in some ultrafilter. A filter F is an ultrafilter if and only if for every subset K ⊆ I one has either K ∈ F or I K ∈ F . [4, §I.6.4] Given a filter F we define a F b to signify a J b for some J ∈ F . In the case of a principal filter F = (K) we have that a (K) b is equivalent to a K b, as defined previously. Analogously we define a ≻ F b to signify a ≻ J b for some J ∈ F , etc.
The following result was first published by A.P. Kirman and D. Sondermann [8] , and implicitly in P.C. Fishburn's previous article [5] . Essentially, it had already been discovered in 1952 by G. Guilbaud [7] . In order to make our presentation self-contained, we will state and prove the essential observation needed for our classification:
Proposition 64 (Filter of decisive subsets). For every arrovian voting system C : P 4 An ideal S in a ring (R,+,·) is a subset S ⊆ R such that (i) r · s ∈ S for all r ∈ R and s ∈ S, (ii) 0 ∈ S, that is, S is non-empty, and (iii) s + t ∈ S for all s,t ∈ S. If we replace the ring (R,+,·) by the boolean algebra (2 I ,∩,∪), then the conditions (i),(ii),(iii) translate to the filter axioms (F1),(F2),(F3). Notice that 0 ∈ R is the neutral element with respect to addition +, while I ∈ 2 I is the neutral element with respect to intersection ∩. 0 would be decisive and C would be the trivial voting system. This being excluded, we conclude that F is an ultrafilter.
Conversely, a filter F allows to define a map C F : P I A → P A . First of all we have to show that this is well-defined. Obviously, the outcome is a reflexive relation because I ∈ F . The only delicate point is transitivity: given a b and b c, we know that a K 1 b and b K 2 c for some
Condition (F3) ensures that K ∈ F , and hence a c, as desired.
Having proved that C F : P I A → P A is well-defined, we conclude that it satisfies the arrovian axioms: neutrality, monotonicity and independence of irrelevant alternatives are clear by construction. Unanimity follows since I ∈ F , as ensured by condition (F2). By definition, each set J ∈ F is decisive for the voting system C F . Conversely a subset J ⊆ I is decisive if and only if K ⊆ J for some K ∈ F . Hence Condition (F1) ensures that F is the family of decisive sets for C F .
Suppose, moreover, that F is an ultrafilter. Given two alternatives a, b ∈ A consider the set J = {i ∈ I | a i b} and its complement K = {i ∈ I | a ≺ i b}. Since F is an ultrafilter we have either J ∈ F or K ∈ F . This shows that a b or a b, in other words, the outcome is a complete ordering.
As in the finite case, it is easiest to classify voting systems for which decisive and strongly decisive subsets coïncide:
Proposition 65 (Classification of juntas without internal structure). Given an arrovian voting system C : P I A → P A on three or more alternatives, let F be the filter of decisive sets, and let F ′ ⊆ F be the filter of strongly decisive sets. We have the double inclusion C F ′ ⊆ C ⊆ C F , and equality C = C F or C = C F ′ holds if and only if F = F ′ , that is, each decisive set is also strongly decisive.
Proof. This is a variation of Proposition 27. The inclusion C F ′ ⊆ C is clear by definition of strong decisiveness. In order to show C ⊆ C F we appeal to Lemma 18: given a b, the supporting set K = {i ∈ I | a i b} is decisive, hence a K b with K ∈ F .
5.4.
Relatively decisive subsets. The preceding Proposition 65 characterizes voting systems in which decisive and strongly decisive subsets coïncide. In general they differ, as shown by lexicographic voting rules (see §5.1 above). In order to classify all possibilities, we thus take up the detailed analysis and consider the filter ∂ N on I N of decisive subsets relative to N, following Proposition 33. If I is finite then this is simply the principal filter ∂ N = (δ N), but in the infinite case ∂ N may not be principal, so that the language of filters is appropriate. We can now reformulate the principal classification, Theorem 40, by replacing the set δ N with the filter ∂ N, which leads to Theorem 67 stated below.
We will end this tour de force in set-theoretic abstraction by adding one final level of technicality. For infinite sets I it is sometimes inappropriate to consider arbitrary subsets K ⊆ I, that is, it may be necessary to work with some restricted family Σ ⊆ 2 I . (See T.E. Armstrong [1, 2] .) Typically this occurs when (I, Σ, µ) is a measure space: quite often the measure µ : Σ → R + is defined only on Σ because it cannot be extended to the whole set 2 I . Consider for example I = R and µ : Σ → R + the Lebesgue-measure defined on the family Σ of Lebesgue-measurable sets. Here the axiom of choice implies that Σ = 2 R .
All that has been said and done in this article generalizes in an obvious way to the measurable context. To be explicit, we demand Σ to be an algebra in the following sense, and that all subsets and filters respect this algebra:
Definition 66. An algebra on a set I is a collection of subsets Σ ⊆ 2 I such that (1) We have I ∈ Σ, and K ∈ Σ implies I K ∈ Σ. Given a measurable space (I, Σ) and a set K ∈ Σ, the collection (K) = {J ∈ Σ | K ⊆ J} is called the principal filter generated by K. One has / 0 ∈ F if and only if F is the trivial filter, i.e. F = ( / 0) = Σ. A filter F is called proper if / 0 / ∈ F . An ultrafilter in Σ is a maximal proper filter in Σ.
We define P I,Σ
A to be the family of measurable preference profiles (P i ) i∈I , that is, we demand the set {i ∈ I | a i b} to be measurable for each pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A. Since Σ is an algebra, all relevant subsets of I thus become measurable, such as {i ∈ I | a ≈ i b}, or {i ∈ I | a ≻ i b}, or {i ∈ I | a ⊥ i b}, etc.
A voting system for the society (I, Σ) is a map C : P I,Σ A → P A , and the arrovian axioms can be formulated as before. (Notice that Σ = 2 I corresponds to a set I without any measurability restrictions.) If there are at least three alternatives, then unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives imply neutrality and monotonicity (Lemma 13). Moreover, the (strongly) decisive subsets K ∈ Σ form a filter in the algebra Σ, and the preceding Propositions 64 and 65 still hold.
As in Proposition 33, it is possible to restrict the electorate to I N for every measurable set N ∈ Σ, by passing from Σ to Σ N = {K N | K ∈ Σ}, the restricted algebra on I N. As before, this trick allows to define ∂ N ⊆ Σ N , the filter of decisive subsets relative to N. In order to translate Theorem 40 to Theorem 67 we remark that J ⊆ K is equivalent to (K) ⊆ (J), so that the inclusions in condition (1) A → P A defined on linear orderings, cf. Corollary 48. This leads again to Corollary 6, which can be formulated without explicit reference to the coalition structure D nor any other technical details.
